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K.: Evidence--Testimonial Impeachment--Admissibility of Plea
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
to the Supreme Court of Appeals. W. VA. CODE C. 61, art. 5, § 26
(Michie, 1949).
In view of this West Virginia law, if the problem of cruel and
unusual punishments as involved in this case would arise in West
Virginia, our courts are not likely to follow the principal case.
The two dissenting judges each subscribed an opinion that the
sentence was not cruel and unusual punishment, and this is in
accord with the rule prevailing in this country. After a diligent
search, no case was found in accord with the Georgia case.
The court left no inference as to what punishment the lower
court could inflict without being in violation of the constitution.
Such a decision seems arbitrary and renders no assistance to the
lower court in administering the rules of justice.
J. L. A.

EVIDENCE-TEsTImONIAL IMPEACHMENT-ADMISSIBILITY OF PLEA

ACTION.-In an
action for wrongful death resulting from the allegedly negligent
operation of an automobile, the defendant was asked on crossexamination if he was by nature a careful driver and if he observed
speed limits at all times. The defendant gave affirmative answers.
Over objection he was then asked if he had not, on a prior occasion, pleaded guilty to a charge of reckless driving and been convicted for that offense. His answer was in the affirmative. The
defendant excepted and moved that the answer be stricken. Motion overruled. Held, the plea of guilty was admissible as affecting
the credibility of the defendant, but the court says it was not competent for the purpose of establishing his negligence. Moore v.
Skyline Cab, Inc., 59 S.E.2d 437 (W. Va. 1950).
The failure of the court to discuss the problems involved or to
assign reasons for its decision makes difficult the interpretation
and application of the rules evolved. It is a matter for conjecture
whether the court was treating this plea of guilty (1) as evidence
of a self-contradiction, or (2) as evidence of negligence. Cases
cited by the court in support of its ruling are cases holding that
evidence of a conviction of a misdemeanor is admissible as evidence
of bad character which serves to discredit a defendant-witness. Cf.
State v. Friedman, 124 W. Va. 4, 18 S.E.2d 653 (1942); State v.
Taylor, 130 W. Va. 74, 42 S.E.2d 549 (1947). The citation of these
cases indicates that the court is treating the plea of guilty as disOF GUILTY AND CONVICTION IN SUBSEQUENT CIVIL

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1951

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 2 [1951], Art. 7
CASE COMMENTS
crediting evidence. If this is so, the result of the case is that a plea
of guilty to a charge of reckless driving is evidence of bad character
and serves to discredit the defendant-witness. Counsel indicate by
the manner in which they asserted it, that is, by first eliciting from
the defendant that he was a careful driver and then asking if he
had not admitted that he was a reckless driver, that they were
treating the evidence as a prior self-contradiction whereby the
defendant-witness discredits himself. A prior self-contradiction
may be a party's admission and is usable in either character. 3
WiGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1040 (3d ed. 1940). Clear authority is available in West Virginia to the effect that a plea of guilty in a prior
criminal action is admissible as an admission in a subsequent civil
action. Utt v. Herold, 127 W. Va. 719, 34 S.E.2d 357 (1945); see
Interstate Dry Goods Stores v. Williamson, 91 W. Va. 156, 159, 112
S.E. 801, 302 (1922). An admission is admissible as an exception
to the hearsay rule, Anthus v. Rail Joint Co., 185 N.Y. Supp. 314
(1920), aff'd mem., 231 N.Y. 557, 132 N.E. 887 (1921); or, when
offered against the declarant as opponent, as not in violation of
the hearsay rule since the declarant does not need to cross-examine
himself. 4 WiGMoaE, EVIDENCE § 1048. Testimonial impeachment
is generally considered to be the first office of an admission. Johnson v. Farrell,210 Minn. 351, 298 N.W. 256 (1941). Contra: State v.
Green, 158 Wash. 574, 291 Pac. 728 (1930).
The court further says that the evidence is inadmissible for
the purpose of establishing the negligence of the defendant. Desire
to prevent the use of prior convictions for traffic violations as substantive evidence in actions arising from motor accidents has
prompted several states to enact statutes prohibiting their introduction, even for purposes of impeachment. There is a contrary
contention that prior negligent acts are highly probative on the
issue of negligence. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 987. It has been
argued that a self-contradictory utterance should be given affirmative testimonial value, 3 WIGMot,
EVIDENCE § 1018; yet the same
authority concedes that it is universally maintained by the courts
that prior self-contradictions are not to be treated as having any
substantive or independent testimonial value. Butler v. Parrocha,
186 Va. 426, 43 S.E.2d 1 (1947). The authorities are in conflict on
the question of whether admissions are to be given substantive
testimonial value. Most courts, including the West Virginia court,
have given them such value. Morrison v. Judy, 123 W. Va. 200,
13 S.E.2d 751 (1941). 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1048. If this is a
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self-contradictory admission and admissions ordinarily serve substantive testimonial purposes, on what basis has the court excluded
it on the issue of negligence? The court indicates that a judgment
rendered upon a plea of guilty would have been admissible as an
admission for this purpose had it arisen on the same facts.
R. C. K.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-PUBLIC OFFICER'S BOND.-D, a commissioner of the County Court of Barbour County, was paid forty
dollars a month for a period of seven months during 1938. The
correct pay rate for this period was fifteen dollars per month. The
State brought an action of assumpsit to recover the overpayment.
Held, that the five-year statute of limitations barred the action.
State ex rel. Alderson v. Holbert, 56 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va. 1949). The
State then brought an action of debt on the official bond against D
and his surety to recover the money wrongfully paid to the principal. Held, that an action of debt brought on an official bond of
a public officer is not barred if brought within ten years -of the
accrual of the cause of action [W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 2, § 6 (Michie,
1949)]. State ex rel. Alderson v. Holbert, 58 S.E.2d 796 (W. Va.
1950).
It appears from all the West Virginia cases in point that the
court was dedicated to a view contrary to that expressed in the
principal case. This was the opinion expressed by Judge Lovins in
his dissent. All of these cases follow the same pattern. An action
is brought by a private citizen against the officeholder and the
surety on his official bond after the expiration of the period of
limitation for charging the officeholder with the tort itself. A
typical example of this series of cases is Town of Clendenin ex rel.
Fields v. Ledsome, 129 W. Va. 388, 40 S.E.2d 849 (1946). The D
police officer and his surety were sued in covenant by the town
on behalf of Fields who was negligently injured by fire while
in the town jail. Held, that the action was barred by the running
of the one-year statute of limitations for a tort action. The other
cases are: State ex rel. Sabatino v. Richards, 127 W. Va. 703, 24"
S.E.2d 271 (1945) (action against constable and surety to recover
statutory penalty), and Byrd v. Byrd, 122 W. Va. 115, 7 S.E.2d
705 (1940) (action against surety and deputy sheriff who shot
sheriff). These previous decisions recognize the principle that a
tort claim may not be waived to extend the statute of limitations
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